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IN THE SUPREME COUR,T
of the
STATE OF UTAH
WEENIG BROTHERS, INC., a
Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
-vs.-

M. NEPHI MANNING,
Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR DISMISSAL OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO SAID PETITION
Comes now the respondent, M. Nephi Manning and
moves this Honorable Court to dismiss appellant's petifor rehearing upon the following grounds:

POINT I
THAT SAID PETITION FOR REHEARING WAS
NOT FILEiD OR SERVED WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY LAW, WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT
PRAYS THAT SAID PETITION FOR REHEARING
BE DISMISSED.
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR DISMISSAL
OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THAT THE PETITION FOR REHEARING WAS
NOT. SERVED OR FILED WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY STATUTE.
The decision in this case was filed in the Supreme
Court November 2, 1953. Rule 76 U. R. C. P. Subdivision
(e) (1) provides:
"within 20 days after the filing of the decision
of the Supreme Court, either party 1nay petition
the court for a rehearing"* "and shall be served
upon the adverse party prior to filing"
Rule 76 U. R. C. P. Subdivision (e) ( 4) provides that:
*"for good cause shown the Supreme Court or any
Justice tlrereof may extend the time for filing
any papers or matter required to be filed in the
Supreme Court by these rules; provided that
only one ex parte extension for not to exc'eed two
weeks shall be granted; if additional time is required it shall be granted only upon written
stipulation or upon two days notice to the adverse
party*"
Petition for rehearing and brief were served upon
respondent, through his attorney, December 31, 1953,
by mail, but was not received until January 2, 1954, t\ro
months after filing the decision of the court. In the
interim no stipulation was entered into between the
parties or their counsel for a greater enlarge1nent of
time, .and no motion or notice of motion for a grt>atPr
enlargement of time was served upon or called to the
attention of the respondent, so that the tilne betwePn
2
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filing of this court's decision and serving of the petition
for rehearing upon respond:ent exceeded the 20 days
plus t'vo weeks ex parte extension by at least 25 days
and, hence, said petition should be dismissed.
Dated this 18th day of

•

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THIS COURT DID NOT l\1ISCONSTRUE THE
RECORD IN THIS CASE BY AFFIRMING THAT
PORTION OF THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE
DISTRICT COURT TO THE EFFECT THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS NOT NEGLIGENT IN THE
OPERATION OF HIS AUTOJ\10BILE' AT THE TIME
OF THE ACCIDENT, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID
NOT SO FIND.
All of the facts in this case, as well as the law pertinent thereto, were before this court and wer'e fully
briefed and fully argued upon appeal. The trial court
found that the damage to plaintiff's car was not caused
by any negligence of the defendant but from plaintiff's
own negligence, another way of stating proximate cause,
(Finding No. 8).
There is nothing new or novel in the petition for
rehearing or the arguments of couns'el not fully covered
and gone into in arguments and considered by this court.
3
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There is competent, (even though so1ne contradictory),
evidence in this record upon which the trial court, as
tri!er of the facts, as well as judge of the law, 1nade each
and every finding in its Finding of Fact. This court
will not disturb a finding of the lower court if based
upon substantial evidence and not being unreasonable.
This court fully considered Section 41-6-57 UCA 53 upon
which appellant relies for a rehearing. The s'ection "Tas
fully briefed and argued as will appear fron1 pages 15
and' 16 of its original brief and was discussed by this
court at the bottom of page 1 and the top of page ~ of
the green sheet. The evidence was conflicting, plaintiff
contending that defendant was passing the truck and the
defendant claiming that he was engaged in an exploratory maneuver to determine wheth!er it was safe to pass.
The physical facts support the defendant because he
immediately turned back into his lane of traffic and the
impact occurred less than thr'ee feet east of the center
of the highway, involving the left side of defendant\;
car. Had he been abreast of the truck, he could not
have turned back onto the west side of the highway.
Thle North vs. Cartwright case, 229 P 2d, cited
by petitioner, adds nothing new to the cases already
cited by appellant and considered by the court. In fact,
it is very much in line with the cas es cited in the original
brief, all of them-cases where the party in the position
of the defendant in this case brought an action to recover damages, and _those cases resulting favorably to
applellant's contension simply found that the n1oving
party, the party seeking to recover da1nages, was guilty
of contributory negligence, and, the law in this state
with respect to contributory negligence, is so "·pll established that there is no need to cite eases to this court..
1
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Even if it were found that the respondent was guilty
of negligence, certainly the finding of the trial court that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, under
the circumstances, would bar a recovery.
The Skirl vs. Willow Creek Coal Company 92 Ut
47 4, 69 P 2d 502, is not in conflict with the decision in
the instant case. It can as well be argued and with as
much propriety that the statute and the' law fixing speed
linlits and making it unlawful to op~rate ~ vehicle in
excess of those~ lin1its fixes a standard of duty or care
for the safety of life, limb or property as certainly as
the section upon which appellant relies. ,

POINT II
THIS COURT DID NOT FAIL TO PROPERLY
EVALUATE THE EVIDENCE IN CONCLUDING
THAT THE, DEFENDANT WAS NOT GUIL,TY OF
NEGLIGENCE AS A l\1ATTER OF LAW IN THE
OPERATION OF HIS AUTOJ\IOBILE ON THE
WRONG OR IMPROPER SIDE, OF THE HIGHWAY
AND THAT SUCH NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE
SOLE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
COLLISION.
Counsel's argument under point II completely overlooks the reckless disregard that plaintiff exhibited for
the safety of other persons and property upon the highway in his failure to drive at such a rate of speed and in
his· failure to keep his car under such control that he
could have brought it to a stop within the distance of his
VISion. His argument completely overlooks the fact
that there is competent evidence upon which the court
found plaintiff was driving at a speed in excess of that
fix ed by la'v under circumstances which required extreme
1
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caution, and that by reason of his own negligence found
himself in a position from which the evidence sho,vs he
made very little effort to extricate hin1self. Using the
definition of proximate caus'e fixed by the court in Snook
vs. Long 21 AL·R (1) as follows:
"negligence is the proximate cause of an injury
which follows such negligent act if it can fairly
be said that in the absence of such negligence th~
injury or damage con1plained of would not have
occurred"*.
There is no doubt in the instant case but that if plaintiff
had been driving his vehicl'e at a lawful speed, 23 miles
per hour as testified to by the expert witness, Carter,
if the visibility was 50 feet, and 30 miles per hour if
the visibility was 84 feet, there would have been no
accident and hence, no damage because at the reduced
speed the physical facts make it amply clear, defendant
would' ha.v'e had time to have gotten completely over on
his side of the highway and plaintiff could have continued on unobstructed or plaintiff could have turned
far enough to avoid the impact. In other words, plaintiff created his own condition of peril and did very little,
if anything, to overcome it. With respect to counsel's
statement on page 10, and we quote:
"we are sure this explanation was conjured up by
Manning as a defense measure"'"'
it is not justified in any degree. Disregarding plaintiff's
testilnony and defendant's testimony the physical fart~
bear defendant's contension out. In any event the trial
court saw the witnesses, h'eard their testimony and it
cannot be said that his finding in that regard i~ not
pased upon substantial evidence. Respondenf~ ~vholP
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argu1nent 'vith respect to traffic casualties points up
the reason why plaintiff should have driven catefully
and cautiously on the occasion in question.
POINT III
THE DECISION OF THIS COURT DID NOT
RESULT IN A DANGEROUS PRECEDENT BEING
EJST.A.BLISHED IN THE AUTOMOBILE LAW OF
THIS STATE PERTAINING TO VEHICLES PASSING ONE _A_XOTHER WHILE DRIVING IN AN
OPPO·SITE DIRECTION AND THE· DECISION
NEED XOT BE RECP~LED NOR THE CASE REHEARD.
Appellant's argument on Point III, other than its
statement with respect to members of the bar expressing
surprise and th:e lecture on the bottom of page 11 with
respect to highway accidents, is nothing more than a
reiteration of the arguments contained in its original
brief and made before this court on the original hearing.
We see no reason for the concern or surprise, indicated
by members of the bar, since the original decision
simply follows the law in this state as it has existed
for many years. The position of appellant, if we understand it correctly, is untenantable in that the provisions
of the Statute with respect to passing other vehicles
travelling in the same direction must of necessity be
construed in connection with the other statutes r:egulating highway traffic. In this instance, the statutes
regulating speed, and keeping vehicles under control.
Following appellant's argument to its logical conclusion, the operator of a vehicle travelling at any
speed, regardless of how excessive, could never be
found guilty of any negligence against the operator of
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another vehicle lawfully and carefully passing a third
vehicle travelling in the same direction or determing if
safe to pass. We are not impressed that appellant's
lecture on traffic accidents adds anythingto this case
since it does not change the facts in the case or the law
of the state and presents a consideration for the legislature rather than this court. Added to that, as we
understand the statistics, appellant simply makes a case
against himself because fron1 our information, the greatest single cause of highway casualties is excessive speed,
the very manner in which appellant itself violated the
statute.
We, therefore, submit that there is nothing here to
justify a rehearing under the decisions of this court.
In re: McKnight 4 U t., 237, 9 P 299, Browning vs. Pickard 4 Ut. 292, 9· P 573, 11 P 512, Duchen:e au vs. House
4 Ut. 483, 11 P 618 Cummings vs. Neilson 42 Ut. 157, 129
P 619. Many other cases could be cited.
CONCLUSION
The p:e tition for rehearing should be dismissed:
(1) For the reason that it was not filed or served
within the time and manner provided by Rule 76 (e)
(1) and 76 (e) (4) U. R. C. P.
(2) There is nothing presented in the petition for
rehearing which is new or showing that this court
misconstrued the facts or erred in its application of the
law to those facts and that all matters offered in the
petition for rehearing and attached brief were fully
considered and discussed and acted upon by this court.
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